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Abstract  We estimate the impact of R&D on TFP and output in the private sector at the state 
level in the US from 1963 to 2007. R&D has a large effect on both output and TFP at the state 
level in the long run. The R&D elasticity in a state averages 0.056 to 0.143, implying returns to 
state GDP from R&D spending of 83% to 213%.  There are also positive R&D spillovers, with 
77% of the total returns accruing to other states.  The R&D elasticities are either stable or 
increase slightly after 1993.  The effects of R&D are dependent on the levels of human capital 
and development.  States with more human capital have higher own- and other-R&D elasticities.  
States in the lowest tier of economic development have the least own-state R&D elasticity but 
the highest other-R&D elasticity.  We discuss implications for policy in the US and in 
developing countries. 
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I. Introduction 
Much empirical and theoretical work emphasizes that research and development (R&D) 
is an important contributor to economic growth. R&D spending is likely to lead to growth 
through its positive effect on innovation and total factor productivity (TFP) (Romer, 1990; 
Lucas, 1988). As Grossman and Helpman (1994) note, improvements in technology through 
industrial innovation have been the driving force behind the inexorably rising standards of living 
in the developed world over the long run. When a firm invests in R&D, it is expected that new 
ideas, intermediate goods, methods to reduce costs, and final consumer products will be 
developed, allowing the firm to become more efficient and profitable.  In addition to the private 
benefits of R&D, there are positive spillovers within and among firms, industries, and 
geographic regions.  Knowledge developed through R&D is non-rival, so that firms can benefit 
from the R&D investment of other firms, even when they are in different industries or regions 
(Arrow, 1962; Aghion and Howitt, 1992).    
There is great dispersion in both R&D activity and economic growth across nations.  
Table 1 presents average R&D spending as a share of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) during the 
periods 2000-2004, 2005-2009, and 2009 for a selected group of countries obtained from the 
World Development Indicators (WDI, World Bank, 2013).
1
 There is no single trend in R&D 
spending worldwide; while 17 countries performed more R&D in 2005-2009 than in 2000-2004, 
23 performed less. The 5 countries with the highest level of R&D spending as a share of GDP in 
2009 are: Israel (4.46 %), Finland (3.93 %), Sweden (3.60 %), South Korea (3.56 %), and Japan 
(3.36 %). While all these countries are highly developed and some had robust growth during this 
                                                 
1
 Countries included in this table were selected based on data availability and their importance in the world 
economy. 
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period, Japan did not.  The United States, which is in the eighth place, had R&D spending in 
2009 that composed 2.90% of GDP, but had modest economic growth at best—and two 
recessionary years—during the 2000’s. Table 1 also shows that countries like Brazil, Russia, 
China, Italy, and Spain, spent less than half as much as the United States on R&D. Countries 
with relatively low R&D intensity in the table are generally less developed than those that spend 
the most, although some of the lower R&D spenders had high growth rates during the previous 
decade.  Thus the relationship between contemporaneous R&D spending and economic growth 
appears to be highly variable.  
The great apparent heterogeneity among nations is due to at least four factors.  Most 
importantly, the relationship between R&D and economic growth is a long-run relationship.  As 
Griliches and Lichtenberg (1984) note, much of the short-run variation in output and TFP is 
caused by fluctuations in the level of capacity utilization in industry.  The R&D stock is a 
determinant of the long-run trend component of TFP, but may have little to do with the short-run 
deviations from trend.  Second, R&D spending is an investment in a durable good, knowledge.  
Thus, the stock of knowledge is the appropriate input to the production function, not merely 
current-year investment (Romer 1986, 1990). Third, knowledge generally cannot be contained 
within national borders, and firms in one country benefit from industrial knowledge produced by 
R&D performed abroad (Coe and Helpman, 1995).  Finally, the general level of economic 
development in the country, as well as its institutions and even attitudes toward risk-taking and 
entrepreneurship can greatly affect the relationships between R&D, innovation, and growth.    
Given the great importance of R&D for development in the long run, this study attempts 
to quantify the effects that R&D spending has on economic growth and productivity. 
Understanding the role that R&D plays as a determinant of productivity, and consequently 
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economic growth, is important for policymakers. As noted by Cincera (2005), studying the 
impact of R&D spillovers is necessary to identify effective science and technology policies that 
could lead to higher productivity and competitiveness across firms and industrial sectors. To 
reduce the number of complicating factors in the causal relationship between investment in 
knowledge and growth, we examine data from a large collection of related but distinct economic 
areas all sharing a common set of institutions and general level of economic development:  the 
US states. We are thus able to sidestep the fourth set of causes of heterogeneity in the R&D-
growth connection noted above. Thus, we study the impact of R&D on output and TFP in the 
United States during the period 1963-2007. Studying the impact of R&D in the United States is 
also relevant since this country performs the largest absolute amount of R&D
2
 and (as noted 
above) is one of the highest investing countries in terms of R&D intensity.  
There are four key features of our study. First, to our knowledge, ours is the first study 
that examines the impact of total private R&D on the aggregate economies of the US states.  Our 
approach is similar to the one taken by Bronzini and Piselli (2006), who study the impact of 
R&D on productivity in Italy by regions. For our analysis, we build a panel dataset covering all 
states and the District of Columbia for the period 1963-2007. Second, our analysis looks not only 
at the direct effect that private R&D spending has on output and productivity at the state level, 
but also quantifies the spillover effect of R&D across states. As Jaffe (1989) and Jaffe et al. 
(1993) note, a proper foundation for public policy requires knowledge of the social rates of 
return to R&D at different levels of geographic aggregation. Work such as that of Jaffe (1989) 
examining returns to research expenditure within a state understates the social returns (as the 
author acknowledges) since some of the returns flow to other states. In fact, we find the spillover 
effect across states to be sizeable.   
                                                 
2
 In 2007, 33 cents out of every worldwide R&D dollar spent came from the US (NSB, 2010) 
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The third key feature of our study is that we focus on R&D performed by industry, in 
contrast to many studies that include publicly performed R&D. Private sector R&D is expected 
to play a more direct role in promoting productivity and economic growth than research 
performed by universities or governmental institutions. We also focus the analysis on the impacts 
on private sector output and productivity.  Fourth, we choose empirical methodology to assess 
the long run effects of R&D in the economy.  As Coe and Helpman (1995) and Hall and Jones 
(1999) argue, estimating the long-run relationships between R&D, output, and TFP requires 
methodology that exploits the information conveyed by shared trends in these variables.  This 
leads us toward methods for estimating cointegrating relationships among the levels of the R&D 
stock and output or TFP, and away from some methods popular in the macroeconomic growth 
literature that discard the information contained in the levels by looking only at rates of change.  
Our methods include the dynamic OLS (DOLS) and pooled mean group (PMG) estimators, both 
of which are suited to cointegrated data.  Despite our main interest in long-run relationships, the 
latter estimator also allows flexible modeling of the short-run dynamics as well. 
Our analysis shows that the R&D stock has a positive, sizeable, and significant long-run 
effect on output and TFP. Our baseline estimates of the elasticity of output to the stock of R&D 
in the state are 0.056 (when the dependent variable is output) and 0.143 (when the dependent 
variable is TFP).  These elasticities are associated with own-returns to GDP in a state to R&D 
spending of 83% and 213%, respectively.  It also appears that the own-elasticity for R&D 
increased slightly after 1993.  We also find that there are positive R&D spillovers across states in 
the long run: on average, about 77% of total GDP created from R&D investment spills over to 
other states.  Unlike the own-elasticity, the spillover elasticity for out-of-state R&D appears to be 
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stable during our period of study. We also find that the direct and spillover effects of R&D vary 
with the levels of human capital and economic output in the state. 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we provide a literature review where we 
outline the theory and empirical work related to the links between R&D, output, and 
productivity. In Sections III and IV we discuss the data and methodology, respectively. Section 
V presents the results, and Section VI touches on policy implications for the US and developing 
countries and concludes. 
II. Literature Review 
A. Theory on the impact of R&D 
Solow’s (1956) neoclassical growth model, which treats productivity, capital 
accumulation, and population growth as the main sources of economic growth, has been 
modified by later authors to add R&D as a central determinant of growth. Griliches (1979) 
introduced the idea that productivity growth is the consequence of expenditures on R&D. In the 
endogenous growth model developed by Romer (1986), firms’ expenditure on R&D results in 
greater aggregate output because private R&D leads to spillovers through its contribution to the 
public stock of knowledge.
3
 R&D expenditures are central to economic growth because 
technological change is the result of conscious economic investment, and sustained growth 
would not be possible without the R&D spillovers (Griliches, 1992). 
Grossman and Helpman (1994, p.24), in their review of growth theory and endogenous 
innovation, argue forcefully that technological progress has been the main driver of growth in the 
world, where “most technological progress requires, at least at some stage, an intentional 
investment of profit-seeking firms or entrepreneurs.” Thus, under this view, industrial innovation 
                                                 
3
 See Romer (1994) for a good review of endogenous growth models. 
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resulting from R&D investment is the chief engine of economic growth. According to Grossman 
and Helpman (1994), a large investment of resources is required in order to reap benefits from 
the development of scientific ideas. Firms have an incentive to invest in R&D if there is an 
opportunity for them to increase profits. Therefore, if the profitability of R&D is raised (for 
example, through policy that promotes investment) and more investment goes into private-sector 
R&D, the innovation process accelerates, resulting in higher productivity.  
B. Empirical evidence on the impact of R&D 
Empirical studies on the impact of R&D can be classified based on the unit or level of 
analysis: the firm, industry, region, or country. Firm level analyses, beginning with the early 
work of Mansfield (1965) and Griliches (1980a) focus on the impact that a firm’s R&D 
expenditure has on its own productivity.
4
 Some of these analyses also measure spillovers from 
one firm’s R&D expenditure to other firms and industries. Analyses at the industry level 
(Griliches, 1973, 1980b) also look at how R&D in a specific industry leads to higher productivity 
in that industry and other industries as well. Empirical analyses at the regional (Bronzini and 
Piselli, 2006) or country (Griliches, 1964; Nadiri 1980a, 1980b) level study the impact that R&D 
expenditure has on productivity and growth on the specific region or country where R&D 
expenditure originates, and some studies also look for spillovers to other areas or countries.  The 
present study follows the more recent vein of regional studies. 
At the firm level, Audretsch and Feldmann (2004), Cincera (2005), Fritsch and Franke 
(2003), Griliches (1979, 1985), Kaiser (2002), and Khan (2006), among many others, have 
provided evidence of the positive effects of R&D on productivity. Wieser (2005) and Hall et al. 
(2010) provide excellent reviews of the different studies on the impact of R&D at the firm level. 
                                                 
4
 See Hall et al. (2010) for a guided tour through the extensive empirical literature on the returns to R&D.  We 
mention only a few seminal examples in this paragraph. 
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While many of these studies have been performed on data from US firms (e.g., Griliches, 1988), 
others look at firms from Canada (Hanel, 2000), Taiwan (Tsai and Wang, 2004), Italy (Aiello 
and Cardamone, 2005), and elsewhere. Hall et al. (2010) characterize the literature as finding 
“plausible” estimates overall, with the own-elasticities of output with respect to R&D spending 
at the firm level ranging from 0.01 to 0.25 but centered on 0.08 or so. These elasticities lead to 
rates of return to R&D that are generally in the range of 20% to 30%, but may be as high as 75%. 
Hall et al. (2010) conclude that R&D own-elasticity estimates from industry studies tend 
to be “quite close” to those from firm-level data.  Own-elasticity estimates and rates of return 
based on aggregate production functions for entire countries (or regions) tend to be higher, since 
they internalize all intra-country (or region) spillovers among firms and industries.  The studies 
using panel data on countries cited in Hall et al. (2010) have R&D own-elasticity estimates 
ranging from 0.01 to 0.22, resulting in rates of return from 6% to 123%. 
Regarding spillovers across firms and industries, there is a significant amount of work 
showing that geography plays an important role for the positive spillovers that derive from R&D. 
Jaffe et al.’s (1993) analysis—the first to look for evidence of geographic knowledge 
spillovers—concluded that proximity was highly relevant by examining patent citation data in 
the US.  Aiello and Cardamone (2008) studied the spillovers of R&D across firms and industries 
in Italy and came to a similar conclusion for knowledge spillovers. Orlando (2004) found that 
geographic proximity is still important for R&D spillovers across firms after controlling for 
technological proximity, but mainly for cross-industry spillovers. 
In relation to R&D spillovers across regions and countries, Coe and Helpman (1995) 
found that while domestic R&D is associated with greater productivity and economic growth, 
foreign “knowledge stocks” are also critical for explaining TFP. They posit that R&D from 
8 
 
abroad could have a direct positive effect on domestic productivity through the development of 
new technologies and processes and an indirect positive effect through the importation of goods 
or services. Using data from 21 OECD countries during the period 1971-90, they provide 
empirical support to these claims. Similarly, Frantzen (2000) carried out a cross-section analysis 
of OECD countries. He found that economic growth in those countries was closely related to 
innovation, which was influenced by domestic and foreign R&D, and that the importance of 
R&D is higher in G7 countries than in economically smaller countries. Spatial spillovers are also 
found to be important in the regional work of Bronzini and Piselli (2006). 
According to Bayoumi et al. (1999), besides the impact that domestic R&D has on a 
country’s productivity in the long run, R&D spillovers can result from international trade. Under 
this view, a country could achieve higher productivity by trading with other countries that have a 
large stock of knowledge. Bayoumi et al. (1999) show empirically that the degree to which a 
country benefits from R&D spillovers would be determined by the size of trade between the 
country and its trading partners. Furthermore, Coe et al. (1997) argue that developing countries 
could benefit more from the R&D spillovers derived from trading with developed countries than 
from investing in R&D themselves.  Given the large amount of interstate trade within the US, as 
well as the prevalence of multistate R&D performing firms, we therefore expect to find that the 
benefits of R&D in the US spill across state borders. 
Kao et al. (1999) assess the econometric validity of Coe and Helpman’s (1995) modeling 
in light of advances in estimation methods for cointegrated panel data. They argue that Coe and 
Helpman’s (1995) use of OLS leads to estimation bias, and propose the use of dynamic OLS 
(DOLS) instead. We begin (but do not conclude) our empirical exploration by adopting their 
methodology.  Regardless of the bias issue, Kao et al. (1999) and Coe et al. (2009) corroborate 
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the findings of Coe and Helpman (1993) that R&D has a positive direct and cross-border 
spillover effects on TFP.  Coe et al. (2009) in addition highlight that institutional differences 
among nations that affect the environment for doing business can be important determinants of 
R&D spillovers across countries. We largely sidestep this issue by using data from within a 
single, relatively institutionally homogeneous and integrated country, the US.  Coe et al. (2009) 
show that countries with high levels of human capital and a better environment for doing 
business benefit the most from domestic and international R&D. We also find that states with 
more human capital benefit the most from in-state and out-of-state R&D.  More recently, 
Eberhardt et al.’s (2013) analysis also provides support for the importance of R&D spillovers 
across countries, as well as a review of the latest empirical work on R&D spillovers. 
The latest strand of the literature on R&D and productivity takes its data from the 
regional level and examines spatial aspects of the relationship closely. Subnational studies are 
important because much recent work shows that geographical proximity is important for 
transmitting knowledge, given that much learning is localized (see Audretsch and Feldman, 
2004). Focusing on the case of China, Wu (2010) studies provincial data to find that R&D has a 
positive effect on the regional innovation rate, and that innovation has a positive effect on 
productivity and consequently economic growth in China.  Bronzini and Piselli (2006) study the 
long-run relationship between regional TFP, R&D, human capital, and public infrastructure in 
Italy during the period 1980-2001. They find that R&D has a positive effect on productivity and 
that the R&D stock in one region affects productivity levels in nearby regions, showing that 
geography is relevant for R&D spillovers. Using data from the United States, our paper follows 
the spirit of Bronzini and Piselli’s (2006) approach, although our choice of econometric method 
differs. Our method of estimation is also related to the work of Kao et al. (1999) since we are 
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interested on determining the short and long run effects of R&D on output and productivity.  
While interstate research spillovers have been examined in the agricultural sector (e.g., 
Deininger, 1995; Evenson, 1996; McGunn and Huffman, 2000; Alston et al., 2010), to our 
knowledge there is no empirical work that estimates the impact of R&D on aggregate output or 
productivity at the state level in the United States. This is no doubt due in part to a lack of 
enough R&D data at the state level in the past.  We discuss in the next section our methods used 
to create a set of panel data for R&D expenditure and the stock of knowledge in the US states, as 
well as other data used in our analysis. 
III. Data 
To estimate the parameters of the aggregate production function for states, we require 
data on output, R&D, labor, and physical and human capital. For the TFP equation, we require 
the labor and capital shares in addition.  Our sample includes data from 50 states and the District 
of Colombia between 1963 and 2007. We obtained real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for 
private industry by state,
5
 which we refer to as State Gross Domestic Product (SGDP), from the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA, 2013a).
6
 The units are millions of 2005 dollars.  
We use Garofalo’s and Yamarik (2002) state-level panel dataset for the private capital 
stocks.
7
 Our measurement of the labor force is employment in the private sector, which is the 
sum of farm employment and private nonfarm employment. We obtained these data for the 
                                                 
5
 The real GDP by state series from BEA are not available before 1987, and the chained indexes by state series are 
not available before 1977.  Therefore we used the US GDP implicit price deflator (from NIPA table 1.1.9, with 
change of basis from 2009 to 2005) for the US and applied it to the nominal state GDP series. 
6
 The BEA changed its methodology in the state product accounts in 1997, switching from the SIC to the NAICS for 
classification of industry. Given that we do not break GDP down by industry, we ignore this change. 
7
 We use their Net Private Capital Stock created for 1-digit SIC and NAICS industries. We also converted the basis 
of the series from 2000 to millions of chained 2005 dollars. 
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period 1969 to 2007 from the BEA (2013b).
8
 For the six missing years of data before 1969, we 
constructed analogous figures for private industry employment based on the BEA’s 
methodology.
9
  
For the human capital stock, we use the average years of schooling in the labor force.  
Average educational attainment is the most commonly used measure of human capital in the 
literature (Benhabib and Spiegel, 1994; Frantzen, 2000; Bronzini and Piselli, 2006; int. al.). We 
use data constructed by Turner et al. (2006), which covers the years 1963 to 2000. We 
supplemented this series with data from the US Census Bureau’s Current Population Survey 
(CPS) to extend coverage to 2007,
10
 resulting in a blended measure of human capital by state, 
1963-2007.  Unlike our other variables, which are for private industry, of necessity our measure 
of human capital includes the education of government workers. 
We use total R&D expenditure performed by private industry, which was obtained by 
state from the National Science Foundation’s Industrial R&D Information System (IRIS) (NSF, 
                                                 
8
 Our labor force data comes from BEA Tables SA25 and SA25N, Total Full-Time and Part-Time Employment by 
Industry. 
9
 We calculate employment in private industry from 1963 to 1968 from various available but inconsistent sources in 
the following way. First, we collected government employment (GE) from the Statistical Abstracts of the US for 
each year (GE_SAt). These data do not match the figures available from BEA from 1969 on, but we assume that the 
implied growth rate in GE is correct.  Therefore, using 1969 as the reference year, we use the  data from the 
Statistical Abstracts to calculate a government employment (GE) index series (GEIt = GE_SAt/GE_SA1969) for t = 
1963,…,1969. Applying the index to the GE figure from BEA (GE_BEA) for 1969 creates a synthetic series for GE 
during 1963-1968 (GEt = GE_BEA1969/GEIt) that blends smoothly into the BEA series in 1969. We then calculate a 
similar index series for total employment (TE) for the period 1963-1969 (TEIt = TE_Bt/TE_B1969), where TE_B is 
total employment from Turner et al. (2006) (we thank Robert Tamura for sharing these data).  Applying the index to 
the BEA figure for total employment (TE_BEA) for 1969 creates a synthetic series for TE: TEt = TE_BEA1969/TEIt). 
Then we estimate private employment PE as the difference between total employment and government employment: 
PEt = TEt - GEt.  
10
 From each year’s March supplement to the CPS, we constructed weighted estimates for each state of the number 
of years of education of individuals in the civilian labor force.  Schooling in the CPS (variable A_HGA) is interval 
censored, so our calculation assumed that “grades 1 to 4” = 3 years, “grades 5-6” = 5.5 years, “grade 12 but no HS 
diploma” = 11.5 years, “some college but no degree” = 13 years, associate college degrees = 14 years; bachelor’s 
degrees = 16 years; master’s degrees = 18 years, professional school degrees and PhDs = 20 years. We created an 
index series for each state, using methodology similar to that described in footnote 9 for the employment statistics.  
The indices are used to create synthetic state-specific series that blend into the data from Turner et al. (2006) in 
2000.  This procedure tacitly assumes that the growth in human capital after 2000 can be accurately estimated from 
the CPS.  Differences between the series before blending were generally small:  in 2000, the overlapping year, the 
average difference was 1.1% with an interquartile range of 0 to 3.5%. 
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2013).
11
 These data are from a stratified random sample survey, the Survey of Industrial 
Research and Development, and thus are subject to sampling as well as measurement error, but 
the survey is designed to include large performers of R&D with certainty.
12
  There were missing 
observations for some states and years for two reasons.  In 18 out of the 45 years of our sample, 
the NSF collected no data.
13
  In other cases, the data are not reported if one firm did most of the 
R&D in the state that year. We log-linearly impute missing values, but only if they are missing 
for no more than three consecutive years.  The R&D expenditure is converted from nominal to 
real 2005 dollars with the BEA’s aggregate output price index for R&D investment.14 
To construct the R&D capital stock variable, we follow the perpetual inventory method 
used throughout the literature. Specifically, we estimate initial R&D capital stock with the 
formula I0/(g + δ), where I0 is the average investment of the first 3 years available, g is the 
average geometric growth rate of the level of investment in each series, and δ is the depreciation 
rate.
15
 Following Coe and Helpman (1995) and Bronzini and Piselli (2006), we use a 5% 
depreciation rate for R&D.
16
  The final R&D capital stock variable is available for 83.1% of the 
                                                 
11
 The measure includes all expenditure on R&D performed by industry, regardless of the source of funds.  Late data 
are from Table 60, “Funds for and companies performing industrial R&D in the United States, by state and source of 
funds: 1999–2007.” Table H-21, “Total (company, Federal, and other) funds for industrial R&D performance, by 
State for selected years: 1963–98” supplies earlier years. 
12
 For example, by the end of the period all companies among those known to conduct R&D in any of the previous 
five survey years and that spent $3 million or more on R&D were included with certainty.  Details on the complex 
sampling scheme are in Appendix A to NSF (2011). 
13
 Data are missing for even years from 1964-1996 and for 2000. 
14
 The BEA R&D Satellite Account for 2010, available at 
http://www.bea.gov/rd/xls/1959_2007_rd_data_2010RDSA.xls, contains alternatives for indexing R&D investment.  
Copeland et al. (2007) describers the aggregate output price index that we use as “a second-best solution that reflects 
implementation challenges and data limitations” (p.4).    
15
 In states with a break in the time series after imputation, the calculation of the stock variable begins anew after the 
break (i.e., data from before the break are not used). 
16
 Hall et al. (2010) report that the empirical literature typically finds that estimates of the effects of R&D are 
insensitive to different depreciation rates in constructing the knowledge stock.  
13 
 
possible 2,295 state-years in the sample.  States with many missing values are typically those 
with the smallest population.
17
 
In our analysis we also consider the spillover effect of R&D across states. To estimate the 
spillover effect we create a distance-weighted measure of R&D performed in other states. We 
thus assume that an R&D dollar spent in more distant states has less of a spillover than does 
R&D performed in adjacent states.  We use            ∑           , which is the weighted 
sum of other states’ R&D stock. Weights wij are the inverse distances between state population 
centroids from US Census Bureau (2000), normalized to sum to unity for each i. Thus, 
RD_OTHERit is average domestic R&D performed outside the state, where the average is 
computed with spatial lags. As stated above, R&D data has many missing values. To overcome 
this difficulty, we rescale the weights for each year and states as necessary.  Rescaling the 
weights restores the correct magnitude to the weighted average, but does not fully get around the 
measurement error in out-of-state R&D created by the missing data. 
Figure 1 depicts summary statistics for R&D intensity, which is the GDP share of current 
R&D expenditure, between 1963 and 2007 across states. The figure shows that there is more 
variation in the cross-section than the time series:  while the median R&D intensity stays in a 
narrow band between 0.85% and 1.6% over time, the interquartile range across states ranges 
from 1.1 to 2.3 percentage points and some states have an R&D intensity in the range of 4 to 6% 
or higher.
18
  
                                                 
17
 The states with missing observations for R&D stock (with the number missing, out of 45 years possible, in 
parentheses) are: Montana (32), North Dakota (32), Idaho (30), Alaska (24), Vermont (23), Delaware (22), South 
Dakota (22), New Hampshire (21), West Virginia (21), Hawaii (20), Maine (17), New Mexico (16), Oregon (16), 
Washington (16), Nevada (12), DC (11), Nebraska (9), Wyoming (9), Georgia (8), Virginia (8), California (7), 
Mississippi (7), and Kentucky (5). 
18
 The notable outlier on the high side is Michigan in 1993, which had an R&D to GDP ratio of 0.095. 
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Table 2 shows that during this period, Massachusetts and Missouri show the largest average 
spending on R&D as a share of GDP, over 4 percent. In general, states that are less populous and 
have large rural areas spent the least on R&D.  Alaska, South Dakota, Wyoming, and Mississippi 
all spent less than 0.5 percent of their GDP on R&D. Other states that contain important centers 
of advanced manufacturing and high technology spend more of their GDP on R&D. For instance, 
California (the home of Silicon Valley and much aerospace R&D during the period) and 
Washington (the home of Boeing, Microsoft, and many other high-technology firms) spent over 
twice as much as the average of 1.6% of GDP on R&D. Also notable is Washington, DC with an 
average R&D intensity of 2.9%, a large figure no doubt due in part to proximity to the seat of 
federal R&D spending decisions.  Table 3 presents the summary statistics for all the variables 
discussed above. 
Finally, the labor and capital shares of GDP in the private sector are needed to calculate 
TFP.  Following Gomme and Rupert (2004), labor’s share of GDP in a state is found as the ratio 
of unambiguous labor income (UL) to the sum of UL and unambiguous capital income (UK) 
(both restricted to the private sector).  UL is compensation of employees and UK accounts for 
corporate profits, rental income, net interest income, and depreciation in the state.  To smooth the 
resulting UL series, a three-year moving average is taken.
19
 
IV. Methodology 
For the derivation of the empirical model we use to estimate the impact of R&D on 
output and productivity, we follow much of the empirical growth literature (e.g., Coe and 
                                                 
19
 UL is taken directly from BEA NIPA data for the private sector.  UK is calculated using the national income 
accounting identity UK = (private sector GDP) – (private sector UL + private sector ambiguous labor income), 
where ambiguous labor income = taxes less subsidies + proprietor income (Gomme and Rupert, 2004). All data are 
from the state accounts.  The three-year moving average is applied to each state’s UL series before computing UK. 
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Helpman, 1995; Bronzini and Piselli, 2006) and assume a production function with Hicks-neutral 
TFP: 
             
    
   (1) 
where i is a state index, and t is a year index. Y represents private sector output, L is private 
sector labor, K is the private sector physical capital stock; and TFP is Total Factor Productivity. 
TFP is driven by technological change, which in turn is driven by R&D investment, human 
capital accumulation, and other factors.  Therefore we have that  
              
     
  (2) 
where     is the “unexplained” technical change,      is the human capital stock, and      is the 
stock of R&D capital, all for state i in year t. We parameterize unexplained technological change 
as the product of state- and year-specific fixed effects:               . Substituting this 
expression for     into Equation (2) and       into Equation (1), we get: 
         
         
     
  (3) 
       
         
     
    
    
  (4) 
From Equations (3) and (4) we derive the following econometric equations: 
                                       (5) 
                               (6) 
where the lower-case letters stand for natural logarithm, and     and     are error terms for state i 
in year t.  
We adopt alternate assumptions about α and β for purposes of comparison.  In our first 
econometric approach, in which SGDP is the dependent variable (Equation (5)), we make no 
assumptions about returns to scale and place no restrictions on α and β.  The second approach is 
based on Equation (6). TFP is calculated for the dependent variable as               
    
  , 
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where α and β are calculated directly from input shares in the SGDP accounts. This second 
method thus tacitly imposes constant returns to private inputs labor and capital, so that β = 1-α.   
To include the spillover effect of R&D across states in our model, we follow Bronzini 
and Piselli (2006) and introduce RD_OTHER, the distance-weighted R&D stock from other 
states, into Equation (3): 
         
         
     
           
  (7) 
Therefore, Equations (5) and (6) including the spillover effects are: 
                                                   (8)   
                                           (9) 
To account for the year effects   , we time-demean all variables (without explicitly changing our 
notation) from here on except where noted. 
We estimate the models in Equations (8) and (9) using our unbalanced panel with all 
available data between 1963 and 2007. The equations are in levels, which we preserve in our 
choice of econometric methodology in order to assess the long-run relationships in the data.  The 
levels of output, TFP, and the R&D stock also have the advantage of being much less sensitive to 
measurement error than their growth rates, which can bias estimation (Griliches and Hausman, 
1986). However, such trending time series are likely to be integrated, and so we use estimation 
techniques appropriate for integrated and cointegrated data.  Based on the likely cointegration of 
the data, we estimate the parameters of the long-run relationships in Equations 8 and 9 using the 
Dynamic Ordinary Least Squares (DOLS) and the Pooled Mean Group (PMG) estimators. To 
enable unbiased estimation of the long-run relationships, in empirical application we also want to 
model flexibly the short-run dynamics. Below we provide an econometric model incorporating 
17 
 
short-run dynamics, long-run relationships, and heterogeneity across panels that leads to the 
DOLS and PMG estimators. 
Begin with the autoregressive distributive lag form of Pesaran et al. (1999), denoted 
ARDL(p,q,q,…,q): 
    ∑         
 
   
 ∑         
 
   
        (10) 
where xit is a vector of the regressors from Equation (8) (or Equation (9), depending on which 
specification is being estimated), αi is a fixed effect, and εit is white noise. Note that the 
specification allows state-specific coefficients on the lagged dependent variable and regressors, 
allowing for dynamics that differ across units of the panel.   
Before estimating the unrestricted form of Equation (10), we first restrict p = q = 0 and 
furthermore assume y and x are each I(1) and are cointegrated. Then θ = δi0 is the coefficient 
vector describing the long run (cointegrating) relationship between y and x.  Kao and Chiang 
(2001) show that (under certain conditions) a consistent estimate of θ,  ̂    , can be obtained 
from the following panel Dynamic OLS (DOLS) regression 
     
     ∑           
 
    
        (11) 
where the lag/lead length     as    .  The DOLS model is restrictive because it requires 
all variables be I(1), y and x to be cointegrated, and the variance structure and short run dynamics 
to be identical across states.  Thus we use the DOLS model only for our initial estimations. 
Now return to Equation (10) and relax the restrictions imposed by the DOLS model.  
Instead, allow vector x to be I(0) or I(1), and assume that the order of integration of y is no more 
than the order of x.  However, we still assume the long run relationship between y and x 
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(captured by  ) is common across states.  Then, we can re-write Equation (10) in error correction 
form: 
      (        
    )  ∑   
        
   
   
 ∑   
        
   
   
        (12) 
where θ and the starred coefficients are functions of the original parameters in Equation (10).20  
Note that θ is again the long run relationship of interest. The short run dynamics of the 
dependent variable is governed by the deviation from the equilibrium long-run relationship. Note 
that the parameter  , which governs the speed of adjustment to the long run relationship, is 
assumed to be the same across states.  Under the assumptions of Pesaran et al. (1999), we have 
     
        , where for each i, ηit is stationary.
21
   
Given that our data fall into the “large N, large T” case, the Pooled Mean Group (PMG) 
estimator developed by Pesaran et al. (1999) is appropriate.  With the PMG estimator, we will be 
able to estimate the long run effect of R&D on output or TFP with  ̂   , and the estimates for  , 
λ*, and δ* will capture the short-run effects and dynamics.22 The PMG estimator not only allows 
us to obtain estimates that are consistent and asymptotically normal for stationary and non-
stationary variables. The long run coefficients are assumed to be equal across states, but the 
intercept, short run coefficients and error variances differ across states. Testing shows that a 
dynamic specification of the form ARDL(1,1,1,1,1,1) is appropriate.
23
  
                                                 
20
 In particular,   ∑    
 
       ∑    
 
     and is assumed in the PMG model to be constant across i. 
21
 Recall that we time-demean all variables to account for trends not otherwise explained by the model, which 
further ensures the stationarity of ηit. 
22
 For more detailed description of the structure of the PMG model, refer to Pesaran et al. (1999), Blackburne and 
Frank (2007), and Asteriou and Hall (2007).  
23
 Lag length was selected based on the Schwarz Bayesian Information criterion (SBIC). We performed the test for 
each state in the sample and select the lag length that is appropriate in most states (we use the mode of the lag length 
test from all states, which was equal to zero according to the SBIC). 
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For the PMG estimator we require the existence of a long run relationship between the 
dependent variable and the control variables. Thus, the error-correcting speed of adjustment term 
for the long run relationship, ϕi, must be between zero and -2.  We also will consider Hausman 
tests of the PMG and Mean Group (MG) estimates to test whether the assumption of a common 
long-run relationship is appropriate. The MG estimator (Pesaran and Smith, 1995) fits the model 
separately for each group, and the Hausman test looks for evidence that the restriction θi = θ ∀ i 
is invalidated by heterogeneity in the long run estimates. 
V. Results 
In this section, we present the empirical results for the testing of the econometric models’ 
assumptions, the estimates from the baseline estimations, and the results of additional regressions 
designed to check the validity and robustness of our conclusions. 
A. Tests for Nonstationarity and Order of Integration 
The DOLS estimator requires that all the variables be I(1), while the PMG estimator 
requires that the variables be I(1) or I(0), with the order of y no greater than the order of the 
regressors.  To test these assumptions, in Table 4 we shows the results of two different unit roots 
tests for the variables included in our baseline model. There are many tests for panel unit roots 
available; we choose two that are appropriate for large N, large T asymptotics and allow 
unbalanced panels.  The unit root test of Im et al. (2003) has the null hypothesis that all panels 
are integrated and the alternative hypothesis that at least one panel is stationary.
 24
  The results 
for the variables before removing the time-means are in the first column of Table 4, and they 
                                                 
24
 In this test we use a number of lags chosen by the AIC criterion in constructing the test statistic, to account for 
serial correlation.  The test was performed using the xtunitroot ips command in Stata 13 with the 
“lags(aic 5)” option.  
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show that the human capital variable may not have unit roots in each state.  The conclusions are 
the same from the ADF-Fisher tests (Choi, 2001).
 25
  We next test the time-demeaned variables; 
results are in the middle pair of columns of Table 4. We fail to reject the null hypothesis of 
nonstationarity for any variable except TFP at the 5% level, although the null is still rejected for 
human capital at the 10% level.  The ADF-Fisher tests fail to reject the null hypothesis for any 
variable.  There is thus mixed evidence for the nonstationarity of TFP. If TFP is I(0), the DOLS 
estimator will fail but the PMG estimator is still consistent.   
To make sure none of the variables is integrated at higher orders, we repeat the tests on 
the differenced form of the variables (results are in the last two columns of Table 4).  The 
hypothesis of nonstationarity of all panels is convincingly rejected in each case. Thus, each series 
appears to be I(1) in each state, except possibly TFP.  In summary, the data appear to satisfy the 
assumptions of the DOLS and PMG estimators when SGDP is used as the dependent variable but 
satisfy only the assumptions of the PMG estimator with TFP as the dependent variable. 
We also explore whether there is evidence of cointegration, as supposed by our 
estimation strategy. To test for cointegration we use a battery of residual-based tests for panel 
data from Pedroni (1999) and Kao (1999). We perform the cointegration test for the SGDP and 
TFP models using the baseline regression specification introduced in the next section. The results 
are shown in Table 5.  The null hypothesis of no cointegration is rejected in the majority of cases 
overall, although the case is weaker for the TFP regression.  The parametric panel t-statistic, 
which Örsal (2007) found to have the best size and power among the Pedroni statistics, rejects 
                                                 
25 Instead of constructing a single test statistic, the ADF-Fisher test instead combines the p-values from separate 
tests on each panel into an omnibus p-value (Choi, 2001). The test was performed using the xtunitroot 
fisher command in Stata 13 with five lags for serial correlation. 
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the null for all cases except the TFP regression with time-demeaned variables.
26
  Given that 
failure to reject the null may merely indicate low power of a test, we interpret the mixed results 
as providing reasonable evidence for the existence of long-run relationships among the data, 
except perhaps for TFP with time-demeaned variables. 
B. Baseline Estimations 
Table 6 presents the DOLS and PMG estimates for the baseline estimations. We begin 
with three DOLS specifications.
 27
  The first two estimations, for SGDP and TFP, respectively, 
use the raw data without removing the time means.  The third DOLS estimation in Table 6 is for 
SGDP and uses the time-demeaned data. Regardless of which DOLS estimation is considered, 
we find that there is evidence of a positive effect of R&D on SGDP in the long run from R&D 
performed in the state. The long-run own-elasticity for R&D varies from 0.013 to 0.061 among 
the estimations. These elasticities fall within the range of results for R&D own-elasticity 
estimates from country-level panel data studies cited in Hall et al. (2010). We defer interpreting 
the magnitudes of the elasticities until our preferred PMG estimation. 
The results for the impact from other-state R&D are mixed. In the first estimation, the 
other-elasticity is 0.050 and highly significant.  The second estimate is about the same magnitude 
but insignificant.  Recall that the dependent variable in this regression, TFP, may not be 
integrated within each state, which would lead to inconsistency in the DOLS estimates.  The 
third estimate, from the time-demeaned data, is negative, a puzzling result. There are some other 
unexpected results that may indicate that the assumptions of the DOLS model are not satisfied.  
While capital and labor contribute positively and significantly to SGDP, the coefficient on 
                                                 
26
 We note that the same tests that fail to reject at the 5% level in the baseline R&D regressions of Bronzini and 
Piselli (2006) (the panel v-, and group and panel ρ-statistics) also fail to reject here.  They nevertheless concluded, 
as we do here, that the evidence is for the existence of long-run relationships among the data. 
27
 The number of leads and lags in each DOLS estimation was selected based on the SBIC. 
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capital is larger than (in column 1) or equal to (in column 3) the coefficient on labor.
28
 
Furthermore, human capital is not statistically significant in the first estimation, which is 
unexpected given the great importance this variable has been found to have in other growth and 
TFP regressions (Mankiw et al., 1992; Coe et al,, 2009; Bronzini and Piselli, 2009). The 
insignificance of human capital in the cointegrating relationship may be related to the evidence 
presented above that human capital may not in fact have a unit root in all panels before time-
demeaning the variable.
29
  
The varied performance of the DOLS approach leads us to examine the more general 
PMG estimator.  The baseline PMG estimates are shown in Table 6, Columns 4 and 5 (long-run 
coefficients only).  All PMG estimates use the time-demeaned data.  We observe that in all 
estimations we meet the condition for the existence of a long run relationship between the 
dependent and control variables:  the error correction term and its confidence interval are 
between zero and -2.  Furthermore, the Hausman tests for the estimations shown in Columns 4 
and 5 fail to reject the assumption of a common long-run relationship for all the states.
30
  
Column 4, in Table 6, shows the estimates for the baseline model that uses SGDP as 
dependent variable.  Looking at the long run coefficients, we find that all of the inputs contribute 
in a positive and statistically significant way to SGDP.  The long run coefficients of labor and 
physical capital stock are 0.729 and 0.334, respectively. The sum of these two coefficients is 
                                                 
28
 The conventional wisdom (and much empirical evidence) holds that labor’s share of output is about twice 
capital’s share of output in the US economy. 
29
 The DOLS estimates shown in Table 6 are similar to results found when we use the Fully Modified Ordinary 
Least Squares (FMOLS). FMOLS, a competing estimator to DOLS, has been found to perform worse than DOLS 
when estimating cointegrated panel regressions, and we do not report the results here.  See Baltagi (2008, p.299) for 
a discussion of the DOLS and FMOLS. FMOLS Results are available upon request. 
30
 The p-values for the Hausman test of the consistency of the PMG estimates (vs. the MG estimates) are 0.69 and 
0.89 for the estimations shown in Columns 4 and 5 of Table 6, respectively. 
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1.06, indicating that there are slightly increasing returns to scale to physical inputs.
31
  These 
estimates are also close to the conventional wisdom regarding labor and capital shares in the US 
economy (2/3 and 1/3, respectively). Human capital is measured to have a large impact in the 
long run, with a coefficient of 1.257.  
The long run coefficient of the log R&D stock is 0.056 in the SGDP model.  This 
elasticity falls within the range of results for R&D own-elasticity estimates from country-level 
panel data studies cited in Hall et al. (2010).  Our result for the own-elasticity of R&D in the US 
states is not far from Coe and Helpman’s (1995) elasticity for OECD countries of 0.097 and 
Bronzini and Piselli’s (2009) estimates in the range of 0.014 to 0.076 for Italian regions. To 
convert our elasticity to an estimate of the marginal returns to R&D performed within a state, we 
can multiply the elasticity by Y/RD.  Using the SGDP-weighted average R&D to output ratio for 
each state and then calculating a SGDP-weighted average across states returns an estimated 
marginal return to R&D of 82%.
32
  For comparison, Coe and Helpman (1995) found that the 
returns to within-country R&D averaged 123% for G7 OECD countries and about 103% for the 
US in particular.
33
  Given that their estimate of the returns to R&D includes interstate spillovers 
and ours does not, it is natural that we find lower returns.  
Note that the marginal returns reported here are for the one-year impact based on the long 
run relationship in equation (4), in keeping with the practice in the literature.  Since increasing 
the stock of R&D in one year also increases available R&D capital in future years, the 
accumulated marginal impact of R&D expenditure is much greater.  With R&D depreciation of 
                                                 
31
 The confidence interval for the sum is [1.04,1.09], which rejects constant returns to scale in favor of increasing 
returns to scale.  We return to this point in our discussion of the models with TFP as the dependent variable. 
32
 The formula we use for the marginal impact of own R&D is  ∑      , where δ is the own-elasticity for R&D, 
    ̅  ∑  ̅   is the cross-state GDP weight,    ∑              is the average output to R&D ratio in the state, and 
        ∑      is the within-state GDP weight. 
33
 Although Coe and Helpman (1995) do not report a figure specifically for the US, we find the latter figure by 
multiplying their reported GDP/RD ratio of 4.39 by their estimated elasticity for the US of 0.2339 (=1.027).  
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5% and discounting future GDP at 10% per annum, for example, the accumulated marginal 
returns in present value are greater than the single-year returns by a factor of 7.3.
34
 
Similarly, the impact of the R&D stock in other states is sizeable and statistically 
significant. The R&D spillover elasticity is 0.313.  This figure is naturally much larger than the 
own-elasticity, since a 1% increase in the weighted average of other states’ R&D stocks 
represents a huge amount of additional R&D performed out-of-state.  The marginal return to a 
one-dollar increase in the out-of-state weighted R&D stock (which would require each other 
state to raise its R&D stock by one dollar) is 569%.  Since the average weight of another state in 
the calculation of RD_OTHER is 1/50, we can say (roughly speaking) that a dollar spent on R&D 
in another single state j has a marginal return of about 11.4% (=569%/50) for state i. 
R&D spillovers among states can also be examined on a state by state basis.  Table 7 
shows the own-state marginal returns to R&D, the returns spilled over to other states,
 35
 the 
spillover ratio (defined as the latter divided by the former) and the percentage of total marginal 
returns that are spilled over to other states.  The average spillover ratio is 4.9, indicating that 
every dollar added to own-state GDP from increased R&D is accompanied by almost $5 of 
SGDP created elsewhere.  The average spillover fraction is 77%.  There is wide variation in the 
amount of social returns that the states keep within their own borders.  Alaska and Hawaii are 
estimated to see less than 10% of total returns spill over to other states, while more than 90% of 
                                                 
34
 Increasing the R&D stock by $1 in year t leads to stocks increased by $(1-δ) in year t+1, $(1-δ)2 in year t+2, and 
so on.  Therefore if the estimated one-time marginal return to R&D expenditure is m and the discount rate is ρ, the 
present value of accumulated marginal returns is    ∑ [           ]                    .  With 
ρ=10% and δ=5%, M = 7.33.  This scaling factor can be applied to all the reported marginal returns in the paper. 
35
 The formula for the marginal impact of R&D in state i on output in other states is  ∑         , where π is the 
elasticity of output with respect to the out-of-state R&D stock,     is the spatial weight from the definition of 
RD_OTHER,    ∑                    is the average output to out-of-state R&D ratio in the state, and     is as 
defined in footnote 32. 
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total returns leave the borders of Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho, Michigan, New Jersey, and New 
Mexico.
36
 
The 255 short run coefficients are not reported in the table (recall that the short run 
coefficients are allowed to vary freely among states in the PMG estimator).  However, the results 
show that the average short run coefficient for the R&D stock is insignificant.  Thus, on average 
across states, own-R&D has no impact on SGDP in the short run after controlling for the long-
run relationship.  Given that previous literature focused exclusively on the long-run relationship 
between R&D and growth, we do not have other results to which to compare this finding. 
However, it does emphasize that the mechanisms in the economy transforming R&D activity into 
economic growth are primarily long-run in nature, and perhaps exclusively so.  We also find that 
the average short-run coefficient for other states’ R&D is insignificant at the 5% significance 
level.
37
 Since we observe no significant short-run impact of R&D after accounting the long-run 
relationships in the data, in the following discussion of results we focus solely on the long run 
coefficients.  
We also estimate the impact of R&D on TFP using the PMG estimator, and the 
coefficients are shown in Column 5 of Table 6. All the long run coefficients in the model for 
TFP are statistically significant and the long-run elasticities are higher than those estimated in the 
baseline model for SGDP. The elasticity coefficient for the R&D stock of 0.143 implies that the 
own-state marginal returns to R&D are 211% on average, which is high compared to most other 
estimates in the literature.
38
  Recall that the regressions for TFP require the assumption of 
constant returns to scale in labor and capital.  Since the baseline estimation for SGDP formally 
                                                 
36
 Recall that the own-state and other-state R&D elasticities are the same for all states. Thus, differences in the 
returns and spillovers in Table 7 come from differences in the spatial weights and the SGDP to R&D stock ratios of 
the states. 
37
 The average short-run coefficient for rd_other is, however, significant at the 10% level, but just barely:  p = 0.099. 
38
 See Table 5 in Hall et al. (2010). 
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rejects this assumption, it may be that the elasticities from the TFP regression are biased.
39
  
Recall further that the evidence for cointegration in this regression, discussed in the previous 
section, was weaker than for the other regressions.  For all these reasons, and to err on the side of 
understating the returns to R&D, we therefore use SGDP instead of TFP as the dependent 
variable in the remainder of the paper. The spillovers calculated from the TFP regression are 
larger in amount but smaller relative to within-state returns.  The elasticity for other-state R&D is 
0.531, leading to a spillover ratio of 3.2 and a spillover fraction of 70% (using the same 
methodology as for the figures in row 1 of Table 7).  
C. Robustness Checking and Extensions 
In this section, we explore whether the long run effect of R&D on SGDP is robust to 
alternative specifications and extensions.  We use the PMG estimator with the dependent 
variable SGDP for all these additional regressions. We begin with estimating the model without 
including the spillover effect of R&D, to demonstrate that our finding of a large own-R&D 
elasticity does not depend on the spatial assumptions employed in our construction of the other-
R&D stock. The results of the PMG estimation when RD_Other is omitted are in column 1 of 
Table 8.  The estimated own-elasticity for R&D is larger (0.076 versus the estimate of 0.056 
from the baseline estimation) when we do not include other states’ R&D stock. This finding is in 
accord with the literature, where it is emphasized that it is important to include the spillover 
effect when looking at the impact of R&D.  Otherwise, given the generally positive correlation 
                                                 
39
 Apart from the assumption of constant returns, there is another difference between the SGDP and TFP 
regressions.  The regressions of SGDP assume that the long-run coefficients on labor and capital are identical across 
states.  The calculations involved in creating the TFP variable instead use state-specific labor and capital shares.  
Therefore while the TFP regression relies on a restrictive assumption of constant returns, it allows more flexibility 
than the SGDP regressions regarding the shares. Thus we would not necessarily expect the estimates from the SGDP 
and TFP regressions to be the same. Furthermore, neither assumed data generating process nests the other, 
preventing simple specification testing. 
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between domestic and foreign R&D stocks, the direct effect of R&D would likely be 
overestimated.  
We also test for evidence of change in the R&D elasticities between the periods 1963-
1992 and 1993-2007.  The R&D coefficients may differ in the later period for two reasons.  
There may have been structural shifts in the economy that changed the returns to R&D or the 
magnitude of R&D spillovers.  For example, information and communications technology (ICT), 
which greatly affected the nature of R&D as well as production (Howells, 1995), had a rising 
contribution to US economic growth during the period of our study (Jorgenson, 2001). 
Furthermore, our R&D data are available more consistently in the later period, and there may 
therefore be a composition effect.  For the latter reason, testing whether the R&D coefficients 
changed also serves as a test for bias in the estimates due to missing data in the earlier period.   
To test for change in the R&D elasticities, we interact the R&D variables with an 
indicator variable for the period 1993-2007. These estimates are shown in column 2 of Table 8. 
The results indicate that the own-R&D elasticity increased in the later period, but only by a small 
amount.  The elasticity from the long run coefficient is 0.050 in the early period and increases by 
a statistically significant 0.008 in the later period.  The own-R&D elasticity during 1993-2007 is 
thus very close to the estimate from the entire sample in column 4 of Table 6. There is no 
evidence that the elasticity from out-of-state R&D changed over time.  Taken altogether, these 
results indicate that any bias due to missing R&D data in earlier years is small at most.   
We also estimate a specification in which lagged R&D replaces current-period R&D in 
equation (5).  By using contemporaneous R&D in the previous estimations, we have followed the 
bulk of the recent literature.  However, given that it takes time for R&D to result in innovations 
(Mansfield et al., 1971; Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1982), we may expect the impact of lagged 
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R&D to be higher than that of contemporaneous R&D.  The results are in column 3 of Table 8.  
The own-R&D elasticity of 0.074 is indeed more than five times higher than in the baseline 
estimation, but the other-R&D elasticity of 0.217 is lower.
 40
  However, neither of the changes in 
elasticity when lagging the R&D variables is statistically significant.
41
 
The PMG estimations above restrict the long run coefficients to be the same across states.  
We now explore whether the direct and spillover effect of R&D in the long run varies across 
states with different levels of human capital and output per worker. Having better educated 
workers leads to greater assimilation of the new knowledge created through R&D. Given that the 
literature has found evidence of such complementarity between R&D and the skill level of 
workers (Hall et al, 2010), it is expected that the benefits of R&D are likely to be greater for 
those states with higher levels of human capital. In relation to the level of output per worker, we 
expect that states with higher level of economic development will have a more advanced 
infrastructure and an environment that would allow R&D to have a greater impact on growth and 
productivity.   
We categorize states based on their time-averaged levels of human capital and SGDP per 
worker into three groups: low, medium, and high. A full set of dummy variables for the groups 
are interacted with rdit and rd_otherit in these estimations.  The long-run estimates from these 
models are shown in Table 9, with the estimates for states differentiated by levels of human 
capital in column 1.  The results show that R&D has positive effects on SGDP for all groups of 
states, and the impacts are higher when there is more human capital in the state.  Both the own-
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 If the lag length is increased to two and three years, the own-R&D elasticity remains higher than in the baseline 
estimation using contemporaneous R&D (the elasticities are 0.062 and 0.070, respectively).  The other-R&D 
elasticities show more sensitivity to lag length, with elasticities of 0.318 (two-year lag) and 0.247 (three-year lag).  
However, the log likelihood from these estimations is lower than that reported in column 3 of Table 8. 
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 The hypothesis test for equality of the coefficients on own-R&D from the estimations using current R&D and 
lagged R&D was performed using a panel bootstrap estimation of the standard error for the difference in coefficients 
(400 replications). The p-value from the t-test is 0.73. A similar test for other-R&D returns a p-value of 0.64. 
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R&D and other-R&D elasticities rise with the level of human capital, and a joint Wald test 
confirms that there are statistically significant differences among the coefficients.   However, the 
other-R&D coefficient is insignificant for the lowest human-capital group of states, perhaps 
indicating that some threshold level of human capital is required in order to reap the benefits of 
R&D spending from other states.  The idea of the necessity of improving domestic human capital 
through technical education in order to appropriate the benefits of foreign technology is at least 
as old Friedrich List’s writings on national systems of innovation in the mid nineteenth century 
(Freeman and Soete, Ch. 12, 1997). 
When investigating whether the effect of R&D differs across levels of GDP per worker 
(Column 2 of Table 9), we find a similar story for own-R&D elasticity but the opposite for the 
other-R&D coefficients. Again, a joint Wald test confirms that there are statistically significant 
differences in the R&D elasticities among the groups.  The elasticities for the own-R&D stock 
increase with GDP per worker, but are only significant for those states with medium and high 
levels of development.  Three interpretations of these results are possible.  It may be that a state 
needs to have a certain level of development to benefit from the state spending on R&D. The 
states in the lowest development group, which evinces no significant effect of own-R&D, are 
rural, mostly small states.  Such states may not have the human capital or R&D intensive 
industries that benefit from performing R&D.  It may also be the case that states in the lowest 
development group do not perform enough R&D to affect SGDP measurably.  The real R&D 
stock for the low-development group averages less than a third as much as for the middle group, 
and less than one-tenth as much as for the highest development group.
42
  Finally, it may be the 
case that the states in the lowest development group do not have many multistate R&D 
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 The R&D stock averages $4,618 million for the low GDP-per-worker group, $15,497 million for the middle 
group, and $48,043 million for the highest group. 
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performing firms, and that such firms are a significant transmission mechanism for R&D 
spillovers across state lines.  We return to the implications of this latter point in the concluding 
section. 
On the other hand, the results in Column 2 of Table 9 show that states in all development 
groups benefit from spillovers.  Here the elasticities are largest for those states with the lowest 
SGDP per worker and vice versa. The sensitivity of SGDP to out-of-state R&D in states with 
low levels of development may be high because these states both do the least in-state R&D and 
have the least impact to show for it.  Such states rely heavily on the knowledge created by other 
states.   
VI. Conclusion 
Our investigation of the relationship between investment in R&D capital and productivity 
allows us to draw the following conclusions.  First, we observe in nearly all of the many 
specifications estimated that R&D performed within a state has a positive, significant effect on 
SGDP through TFP in the long run. The finding of a positive impact of R&D on SGDP is robust 
to the inclusion or exclusion of other-state R&D, to allowing the elasticity to change over time, 
and to the lag length chosen for R&D. The estimated contemporaneous marginal return within 
the state to R&D investment is 82% in our baseline estimation. The accumulated returns over 
ensuing years are many times larger in present value. Thus, our study demonstrates—apparently 
for the first time—that the positive linkages from R&D to productivity growth found in the 
literature at the firm, industry, and national levels also apply to the US state level.  Second, we 
find that R&D does not seem to have significant short-run impacts on productivity, whether the 
R&D is performed within the state or in other states.  This highlights the long run nature of the 
link between R&D investment and growth in a state’s economy.   
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Third, we find strong evidence of positive R&D spillovers among US states.  Our results 
indicate that for every dollar R&D investment adds to own-state GDP, an average of nearly $5 of 
GDP is created in other states.  Considering the R&D spillovers another way, we also find that a 
dollar spent on R&D in one state has a marginal return of about 11% in another state on average. 
Fourth, we find some variation in the R&D elasticities across the sample.  The evidence 
indicates that the own-elasticity of R&D increased, albeit only slightly, between the periods 
1963-1992 and 1993-2007.  Furthermore, the levels of human capital and development are 
relevant when looking at the impact of R&D.  The more human capital a state has, the higher are 
the own- and other-R&D elasticities.  At the lowest levels of human capital in a state, there is no 
measurable impact from R&D performed in other states at all.  Similarly, at the lowest level of 
state economic development there is no impact of in-state R&D activity on productivity.  
Economic output in such states is also the most sensitive to the R&D stocks of other states. 
Our findings have policy implications for the US and for developing countries. Many 
authors have long argued that the difficulties in appropriating the fruits of knowledge production 
gives the government a role in promoting R&D to improve social welfare (Nelson, 1959; Arrow, 
1962).  Note that we cannot conclude from our research alone that the private incentives to 
perform R&D are deficient, due to the fact that most companies that perform R&D operate in 
multiple states (and, indeed, multiple countries).
43
  R&D-performing multistate corporations are 
an important channel for the spillovers among states (Adams and Jaffe, 1996), and some of the 
spillovers among states will be internal returns to these firms.
44
  Nevertheless, the large body of 
previous work on firm-level returns to R&D make it clear that positive externalities exist (Hall et 
                                                 
43
 Around 80% of aggregate US industrial R&D was performed by multinational corporations in 1982 (Dunning, 
1988). 
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 Adams and Jaffe (1996) find that within-firm R&D performed outside the state of a particular plant increases TFP 
at the plant, albeit not as much as when the R&D is performed in the same state. 
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al, 2010), and there is a potential role for government at both the state and federal level.
45
  
However, since we have shown that the lion’s share of the benefits of R&D activities for output 
and productivity leak across state lines, basic considerations of political economy imply that state 
governments have deficient incentives to promote investment in R&D.  To the extent that 
intervention is desired and that effective policy can be found to promote private R&D (Hall and 
Van Reenen, 2000), it thus appears that multistate cooperative or federal efforts are warranted.   
Regarding implications for US state policy makers in particular, recent work has found 
that state R&D tax credits merely draw R&D activity from surrounding states, so that states play 
a nearly zero-sum game (Wilson, 2009).  Thus, there may appear to be no scope for cooperation 
among states in a region in setting R&D policy.  However, our results suggest that R&D 
spending contributes strongly to the economic growth of nearby states.  Therefore, coordinated 
R&D incentives in a region across states, either from multistate policy cooperation or federal 
policies, can increase economic growth of the entire region.  Furthermore, our analysis provides 
evidence for synergy between human capital and the impacts of own-R&D and R&D “spill-ins” 
from other states.  This highlights the continuing need for states to seek to improve opportunities 
and attainment in education, particularly in the STEM areas that are necessary for R&D. 
Our findings also have implications for developing countries, particularly since the global 
distribution of R&D is beginning to shift toward emerging economies such as China (UIS, 2010).  
In many less‐developed countries (LDCs) there is an uneven concentration of firms performing 
R&D, with most activity centered on an “innovation hub” or “innopolis” (UIS, 2010; Jung and 
Mah, 2013).  Indeed, such regional variation is the norm (UIS, 2010).  Some proponents thus 
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 Demsetz (1969), however, contends forcefully that the existence of positive externalities in R&D do not 
necessarily indicate that government should intervene in the market, because actual governmental intervention is 
also imperfect.  In this view, a careful comparative institutions approach and analysis of specific policies is 
necessary before concluding that the market underperforms relative to realistic alternatives. 
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advocate that governments in LDCs should promote R&D activity in lagging geographic areas to 
reduce regional inequality (Jung and Mah, 2013).  However, our results show that (within the 
US) most benefits from R&D flow to other regions of the country anyway.  Thus, perhaps more 
important than stimulating R&D in lagging areas of a country is the strengthening of the national 
system of innovation (Freeman and Soete, Ch. 12, 1997) so that all areas can benefit from R&D, 
wherever it is performed. 
Our results suggest the importance of three particular aspects of building up an LDC’s 
national system of innovation.  The importance of human capital for reaping the benefits of R&D 
in the home region and from other parts of the country has already been noted above.  
Furthermore, since multinational corporations (MNCs) play a leading role in private-sector 
knowledge creation in many LDCs (Narula, 2005), attention must be paid to facilitating the 
linkages MNCs build with local economic agents.  As Narula (2005) states, such “linkages 
constitute one of the ways in which skills and technological transfer is thought to disseminate to 
the rest of the economy. Thus [MNCs] can promote domestic enterprise and technological 
learning in the entire national system” (p.55).  Thus trade liberalization and the encouragement 
of partnership between MNCs and domestic firms and public sector organizations such as 
universities are important for developing countries.  These aspects are related, since human 
capital is one of the main determinants of the ability for an LDC to absorb spillovers from R&D 
performed by MNCs.  Finally, deficient institutions and social capital—the “ground rules for 
interaction between economic actors”—can also decrease the absorptive capacity of an LDC 
(Narula, p. 49, 2005).  Policymakers in LDCs can build social capital both by establishing stable 
and trustworthy public sector institutions and by firmly upholding the rule of law, intellectual 
property rights, and incentives for innovation in the private sector.   
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For further research, as more statistics become available on R&D funding by sub-national 
public sources, it would be interesting to explore whether privately funded R&D has different 
productivity effects than publicly funded R&D.  Even setting aside the question of whether 
publicly funded R&D crowds out privately funded R&D, many studies find the returns to 
publicly funded R&D to be lower than returns to privately funded R&D (Griliches, 1980a,b; see 
Hall et al. (2011) for others).  Whether this is also true at the state level, and whether R&D 
funded by the state is more effective than R&D funded by the federal government is unknown.  
Determining whether there is a difference in the returns to R&D in the private sector with respect 
to R&D spending in the public sector would provide important implications for Science and 
Technology policy. Another fruitful avenue of inquiry may be to complement the aggregate data 
we examine with a study of firm level data, to identify how much of the interstate spillovers are 
privately captured within firms.  Such knowledge would help assess the strength of the rationale 
for state and regional R&D policy intervention based on deficient private incentives. 
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Figure 1:  Industrial R&D as a fraction of GDP in US states, 1963-2007 
  
Notes:  figures include R&D performed by industry.  Nominal data are used for R&D 
expenditure and state GDP. Authors’ calculations; using NSF data as described in text. 
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Table 1. Research and development expenditure as a percentage of GDP* 
Country  00-04 05-09 2009 Country  00-04 05-09 2009 
Israel 4.39 4.60 4.46 Portugal 1.64 0.74 1.21 
Finland 3.38 3.61 3.93 Czech  1.48 1.17 1.44 
Sweden 3.84 3.59 3.60 Estonia 1.43 0.73 1.17 
Korea, Rep. 2.47 3.19 3.56 Spain 1.39 0.98 1.27 
Japan 3.09 3.40 3.36 New Zealand 1.30 1.15 1.21 
Denmark 2.49 2.69 3.06 Italy 1.26 1.09 1.17 
United States 2.64 2.73 2.90 Russian  1.25 1.18 1.11 
Germany 2.50 2.62 2.82 Hungary 1.17 0.91 1.02 
Austria 2.12 2.56 2.72 Brazil 1.17 0.98 1.07 
Singapore 2.04 2.40 2.43 Tunisia 1.10 0.61 1.00 
France 2.18 2.14 2.26 Serbia 0.92 0.58 0.52 
Belgium 1.94 1.91 2.03 Ukraine 0.86 1.04 0.93 
Canada 2.03 1.96 1.92 Turkey 0.85 0.51 0.69 
Slovenia 1.40 1.59 1.86 Lithuania 0.84 0.67 0.80 
U.K. 1.76 1.78 1.86 Croatia 0.83 0.99 0.83 
Netherlands 1.92 1.84 1.82 Hong Kong 0.79 0.61 0.78 
Norway 1.63 1.59 1.78 Poland 0.67 0.58 0.59 
Ireland 1.13 1.39 1.74 Belarus 0.64 0.66 0.74 
China 1.06 1.46 1.70 Cuba 0.61 0.56 0.51 
Luxembourg 1.64 1.61 1.66 Argentina 0.60 0.42 0.52 
*Averages from 2000-2004 and 2005-2009, and value in 2009. 
Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2013). 
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Table 2. Average of R&D expenditure as percentage of GDP, 1963- 2007 
State Code 
R&D 
intensity State Code 
R&D 
intensity State Code 
R&D 
intensity 
Alabama 1.10 Kentucky 0.50 N. Dakota 0.60 
Alaska 0.10 Louisiana 0.40 Ohio 1.80 
Arizona 1.90 Maine 0.50 Oklahoma 0.70 
Arkansas 0.30 Maryland 1.80 Oregon 1.60 
California 3.60 Massachusetts 4.00 Pennsylvania 2.20 
Colorado 1.90 Michigan 4.30 Rhode Island 1.80 
Connecticut 3.90 Minnesota 2.20 S. Carolina 0.80 
Washington, DC 2.90 Mississippi 0.20 S. Dakota 0.30 
Delaware 0.70 Missouri 1.50 Tennessee 1.10 
Florida 1.10 Montana 0.30 Texas 1.30 
GA 0.70 Nebraska 0.40 Utah 1.50 
Hawaii 0.30 Nevada 0.80 Vermont 1.90 
Idaho 2.80 New Hampshire 2.30 Virginia 1.20 
Illinois 1.60 New Jersey 3.70 Washington 3.80 
Indiana 1.80 New Mexico 3.00 W. Virginia 0.80 
Iowa 1.00 New York 1.60 Wisconsin 1.30 
Kansas 1.20 N. Carolina 1.20 Wyoming 0.20 
Source: National Science Foundation (2013). 
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Table 3. Summary statistics for the estimation sample 
 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Value in Levels     
SGDP, millions 2005 $ 1,425.77 1,777.06 45.12 15,704 
TFP 0.15 0.04 0.07 0.53 
Physical capital, millions 2005 $  172,815 216,764 6,370 1,730,723 
Labor force, persons 2,397,588 2,486,807 119,608 18,200,000 
Human capital, years 12.34 1.22 8.88 15.04 
R&D Stock, millions 2005 $, 
δ = 5% 
21,586 42,089 6.56 538,478 
R&D Stock, millions 2005 $, 
δ = 15% 
10,706 21,757 6.56 293,792 
Other states wgtd. ave. R&D 
stock, millions 2005 $, δ = 5% 
21,478 11,554 5,598 85,625 
 
    
Values in Logarithms      
ln(SGDP) 6.72 1.05 3.81 9.66 
ln(TFP) -1.93 0.24 -2.67 -0.64 
ln(Physical capital) 11.53 1.02 8.76 14.36 
ln(Labor force) 14.25 0.97 11.69 16.72 
ln(Human capital) 2.51 0.10 2.18 2.71 
ln(R&D Stock, δ = 5%) 8.68 1.92 1.88 13.20 
ln(R&D Stock, δ = 5%) 8.01 1.85 1.88 12.59 
ln(Other states average R&D 
stock, δ = 5%) 
9.84 0.53 8.63 11.36 
Notes: Summary statistics for annual observations for the period 1963-2010 for 50 states and the 
District of Columbia.  Statistics are based on the sample of state-years for which R&D data are 
not missing after imputation (1,907 observations).   
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Table 4. P-values from panel tests for unit roots  
 Variables in Levels 
 Time-Demeaned Variables in 
Levels 
Time-Demeaned Variables in 
Differences 
 
Im, Pesaran  
& Shin Test 
ADF-Fisher 
Test 
 Im, Pesaran  
& Shin Test 
ADF-Fisher 
Test 
Im, Pesaran  
& Shin Test 
ADF-Fisher 
Test 
Ln(SGDP) 1.000 1.000  0.308 0.205 0.000 0.000 
Ln(TFP) 0.999 1.000  0.020 0.258 0.000 0.000 
Ln(Labor force) 0.100 1.000  0.845 0.358 0.000 0.000 
Ln(Physical capital) 1.000 0.959  0.866 0.919 0.000 0.000 
Ln(Human capital) 0.000 0.000  0.071 0.750 0.000 0.000 
Ln(R&D Stock) 1.000 1.000  0.997 0.345 0.000 0.000 
Figures are p-values from the test stated in the column subheading, where the variable tested is given in the row heading and is 
in levels or differences as specified in the column superheading.  The specified lags for serial correlation in the test statistics is 
five.  The null hypothesis of each test is that each time series in the panel contains unit roots (i.e., that each states’ time-series is 
non-stationary), while the alternative hypothesis is that at least one time series in the panel is stationary.  For the ADF-Fisher 
test, an inverse chi-squared transformation that is suitable for large N is used to combine the p-values from the panels (Choi, 
2001).  
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Table 5. P-values from panel tests for cointegration  
 Non-Time-Demeaned Variables  Time-Demeaned Variables 
Specification: SGDP TFP  SGDP TFP 
Pedroni tests      
Panel v-statistic 0.239 0.078  0.448 0.750 
Panel ρ-statistic 0.942 0.934  0.949 0.997 
Panel t-statistic (nonparametric) 0.000 0.547  0.008 0.997 
Panel t-statistic (parametric) 0.000 0.004  0.000 0.755 
Group ρ-statistic 1.000 1.000  0.996 1.000 
Group t-statistic (nonparametric) 0.000 0.562  0.000 0.999 
Group t-statistic (parametric) 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.006 
Kao Tests      
ADF statistic 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 
tADF statistic 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 
 
Figures are the p-values from the regression-based hypothesis tests for no cointegration from Pedroni (1999) and Kao (1999); refer to these 
sources for the formulae for the test statistics.  The regression specification is the baseline specification as in Table 6.  Rejection of the null 
in favor of the alternative hypothesis of cointegration is evidence in favor of the existence of long run relationships among the regressors.  
Lag length selection is based on AIC; results based on SIC were nearly identical. 
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Table 6. Baseline DOLS and PMG estimation results 
Dependent Variable: SGDP TFP SGDP SGDP TFP 
Estimator: DOLS DOLS DOLS PMG PMG 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Long run coefficients      
R&D Stock 0.032*** 0.061*** 0.013*** 0.056*** 0.143*** 
(0.006) (0.011) (0.005) (0.005) (0.012) 
Other States’ R&D Stock 0.050*** 0.041 -0.086** 0.313*** 0.531*** 
(0.016) (0.027) (0.034) (0.039) (0.080) 
Years of Schooling -0.009 0.843*** 0.423*** 1.257*** 2.811*** 
(0.077) (0.124) (0.128) (0.124) (0.121) 
Physical Capital Stock 0.648***  0.566*** 0.334***  
(0.033)  (0.039) (0.039)  
Labor Force 0.484***  0.571*** 0.729***  
(0.030)  (0.037) (0.039)  
Error Correction (ϕ )    -0.181*** -0.107***  
   (0.025) (0.017) 
All variables time-demeaned No No Yes Yes Yes 
No. States 51 51 51 51 51 
No. Obs. 1,615 1,762 1,619 1,842 1,842 
R-squared 0.999 0.909 0.999   
Log Likelihood    5,021 4169.3 
 
***, **, and * denotes significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
Figures are the long-run coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) from pooled mean-group estimation.  Estimations include observations for 44 years 
during the period 1963-2007. Estimations include a minimum of 12 observations per state and a maximum of 44, with an average number of observations per 
state of 36.  
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Table 7. Marginal returns to R&D investment, within state and spillovers 
 Within-State 
Marginal 
Return 
Marginal 
Return 
Spillovers 
Spillover  
Ratio 
Spillover 
Fraction 
 (1) (2) (2)/(1) (2)/[(1) + (2)] 
SGDP-Weighted 
Average* 
0.823 1.992 4.902 0.767 
Alabama 0.689 2.332 3.386 0.772 
Alaska 9.712 0.655 0.067 0.063 
Arizona 0.490 2.078 4.240 0.809 
Arkansas 6.788 2.363 0.348 0.258 
California 0.230 0.866 3.758 0.790 
Colorado 0.473 1.860 3.935 0.797 
Connecticut 0.210 2.612 12.412 0.925 
Delaware 0.245 2.793 11.401 0.919 
Washington, DC 1.088 3.173 2.917 0.745 
Florida 0.748 1.379 1.842 0.648 
GA 1.476 2.192 1.485 0.598 
Hawaii 7.554 0.499 0.066 0.062 
Idaho 0.167 1.818 10.905 0.916 
Illinois 0.519 2.350 4.526 0.819 
Indiana 0.423 2.778 6.566 0.868 
Iowa 0.805 2.299 2.855 0.741 
Kansas 0.909 2.214 2.435 0.709 
Kentucky 1.942 2.602 1.340 0.573 
Louisiana 1.358 2.054 1.512 0.602 
Maine 2.609 1.599 0.613 0.380 
Maryland 0.434 2.800 6.448 0.866 
Massachusetts 0.211 1.957 9.274 0.903 
Michigan 0.186 2.265 12.196 0.924 
Minnesota 0.395 1.876 4.754 0.826 
Mississippi 7.775 2.334 0.300 0.231 
Missouri 0.443 2.315 5.224 0.839 
Montana 2.546 1.600 0.628 0.386 
Nebraska 4.431 2.097 0.473 0.321 
Nevada 2.666 3.389 1.271 0.560 
New Hampshire 0.642 2.180 3.395 0.772 
New Jersey 0.198 2.755 13.917 0.933 
50 
 
Table continued Within-State 
Marginal 
Return 
Marginal 
Return 
Spillovers 
Spillover  
Ratio 
Spillover 
Fraction 
 (1) (2) (2)/(1) (2)/[(1) + (2)] 
New Mexico 0.113 1.955 17.291 0.945 
New York 0.385 2.242 5.831 0.854 
N. Carolina 0.836 2.176 2.603 0.722 
N. Dakota 2.924 1.646 0.563 0.360 
Ohio 0.378 2.423 6.412 0.865 
Oklahoma 0.945 2.258 2.389 0.705 
Oregon 1.165 1.728 1.483 0.597 
Pennsylvania 0.323 2.484 7.694 0.885 
Rhode Island 0.917 2.642 2.880 0.742 
S. Carolina 1.127 2.327 2.064 0.674 
S. Dakota 10.417 1.891 0.182 0.154 
Tennessee 0.672 2.428 3.614 0.783 
Texas 0.721 1.537 2.132 0.681 
Utah 0.535 2.043 3.819 0.792 
Vermont 0.603 1.961 3.254 0.765 
Virginia 0.804 2.347 2.918 0.745 
Washington 0.265 1.394 5.258 0.840 
W. Virginia 1.269 2.616 2.061 0.673 
Wisconsin 0.613 2.334 3.806 0.792 
Wyoming 15.199 1.857 0.122 0.109 
*For the weighted averages, the figures in the row are calculated first at the state level 
using the formula in the column heading and then are averaged across states. 
Notes:  Figures in columns (1) and (2) are expressed as the one-time marginal returns to a 
$1 increase in the own-state R&D stock. Estimates are based on the estimated elasticities 
from the baseline PMG estimation for SGDP (column 3 in Table 6).  
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Table 8. Additional PMG estimation results 
 Without other-
state R&D 
Period-specific 
R&D Elasticity 
Lagged  
R&D 
Y = SGDP (1) (2) (3) 
Long Run Coefficients    
R&D Stock 0.076 0.050  
(0.006)*** (0.005)***  
R&D Stock, later period  0.008  
 (0.002)***  
R&D Stock, lagged   0.074 
  (0.006)*** 
Other States’ R&D Stock  0.215  
 (0.035)***  
Other States’ R&D Stock, later 
period 
 0.010  
 (0.031)  
Other States’ R&D Stock, lagged   0.217 
  (0.036)*** 
Years of Schooling 1.407 1.338 1.226 
(0.139)*** (0.112)*** (0.129)*** 
Physical Capital Stock 0.436 0.347 0.508 
(0.029)*** (0.036)*** (0.028)*** 
Labor Force 0.657 0.755 0.532 
(0.028)*** (0.037)*** (0.030)*** 
Error Correction (ϕ)  -0.182 -0.204 -0.189 
(0.031)*** (0.026)*** (0.037)*** 
All variables time-demeaned Yes Yes Yes 
Short run coefficients omitted in table    
No. States 51 51 51 
No. Obs. 1,842 1,842 1,791 
Log Likelihood 4,958.9 5,087.4 4,935.6 
***, **, and * denotes significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
Figures are the long-run coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) from pooled mean-group 
estimation.  Estimations in columns (1) and (2) have a minimum of 12 observations per state and a 
maximum of 44 (average = 36). The estimation in column (3) has a minimum of 11 observations per state 
and a maximum of 43 (average = 35).   
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Table 9. Additional PMG estimation results:  Heterogeneous R&D elasticities 
Groups based on: Levels of Human 
Capital 
Levels of 
GDP/worker 
Y = SGDP (1) (2) 
R&D Stock, Low Group  0.058*** 0.003 
(0.014) (0.007) 
R&D Stock, Medium Group  0.064*** 0.084*** 
(0.006) (0.010) 
R&D Stock, High Group 0.086*** 0.088*** 
(0.011) (0.009) 
Other States R&D Stock, Low Group 0.081 0.308*** 
(0.081) (0.098) 
Other States R&D Stock, Medium 
Group 
0.160*** 0.297*** 
(0.040) (0.082) 
Other States R&D Stock, High Group 0.596*** 0.117** 
(0.088) (0.055) 
Years of Schooling 1.579 1.208 
(0.134)*** (0.133)*** 
Physical Capital Stock 0.425 0.109 
(0.032)*** (0.048)* 
Labor Force 0.645 0.992 
(0.033)*** (0.051)*** 
Error Correction (ϕ)  -0.176*** -0.192*** 
(0.028) (0.028) 
Short run coefficients omitted in table   
No. States 51 51 
No. Obs. 1,842 1,842 
Log Likelihood 5,030.1 5,035.5 
***, **, and * denotes significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
Figures are the long-run coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) from pooled mean-group 
estimation.  The high, medium, and low groups refer to group-specific coefficients for the three levels of 
human capital (column 1) and GDP/worker (column 2).  See also notes to previous estimation tables. 
 
